The Newest African-Americans?:
Somali Struggles for Belonging
Cawo M. Abdi
America is God’s crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races
of Europe are melting and reforming!…The real American has not yet
arrived. He is only in the crucible, I tell you—he will be the fusion of all
races.—Israel Zangwill
Not merely a nation but a nation of nations.—Lyndon B. Johnson

I. Introduction
Migration anchors the essence of what it means to be an American.
The “imagined community” is made up of individuals, their parents,
grandparents or even great-grandparents, who crossed oceans to seek
better pastures for their families. In other words, America is synonymous with migration. At its core, it remains characterized by the
different waves of immigrants from across the world who, over the
last five centuries, sought their fortunes and fates in this beautiful
land. However, being an American is also a contested notion, one that
over its long history too often failed to measure up to its ideals. The
slavery of Africans as well as the brutal treatment and extermination
of many Native Americans also anchor the idea of belonging to this
nation. From the founding of the nation at the end of the 18th century,
cracks and contradictions in its ideals continue to manifest themselves
through institutionalized discrimination and the exclusion of certain
groups within its diverse population.
It is this history of racial and class division and how it shapes the
settlement experience of the latest waves of migrants today that will
be the focus of this essay. Drawing from years of primary research
with Somalis in Minnesota and Ohio and other regions of the globe
as well as secondary data, I want to locate Somali migration experiences within the wider debates about integration and the path to
citizenship. My aim is to provide a portrait of some of the key challenges Somalis are experiencing in urban America and their implications for settlement and “belonging.” I argue that this community
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is reaping some of the benefits associated with migration while also
becoming entrenched in inner-city, segregated urban America and is
thus not enjoying full citizenship. The first part of the analysis provides a review of the assimilation debate and its iterations over the last
century. I find that understanding this concept and the critiques leveled against it are essential for new migration streams into the United
States. The second part of the article historicizes Somali migration and
the context and content of the 1990s Somali influx into North America.
This will be followed by a discussion of two key factors that I identify
as being the bedrock of Somali experiences: Somali refugees’ limited
human capital and their ongoing financial obligations to families left
behind. These factors are vital to Somalis’ physical and emotional survival everywhere, while they also impede their settlement in America.
The conclusion assesses the theoretical and policy implications of these
challenges for citizenship and future Somali-American prospects.
II. Migration Waves: Assimilation, Alienation, and In-Between
The earliest scholars of migration explored the questions of identity
and belonging, and the process of settlement and integration into the
American community. These scholars, however, exclusively focused
on the late 19th-century and early 20th-century European newcomers
in metropolitan American cities. The Holy Grail in migration studies
as to how to understand the Americanization process centers on the
notion of assimilation. One 1921 definition of this concept came from
the Chicago School, where Robert Park and E. W. Burgess defined it as
“a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups
acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and
groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated
with them in common cultural life.”1 This concept attempts to capture
the process by which migrants take on the economic and socio-cultural
characteristics of the majority population that they joined.2 Early studies on these ethnic groups found that assimilation was definitely a process that took generations. As Alba and Nee put it, “[It] was only with
the third, and in some cases, the fourth generations that the powerful
undercurrent of assimilation came unmistakably to the surface.”3
The dominant framework was that European migrants would, over a
mere few generations, “melt” into the American mainstream or become
acculturated into what some scholars called American “core culture.”4
Milton Gordon’s view was in fact normative in that it idealized the
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white Protestant and Anglo-Saxon middle-class economic and sociocultural model as representing the culmination of assimilation in its
full cycle.5 The political context in which this debate occurred explains
the attractiveness of assimilation, or what Israel Zangwill called the
ideal of the American “Melting Pot” of all races. This “offered an idealistic vision of American society and identity as arising from the biological and cultural fusion of different peoples.”6 This nationalist vision
attempted to erase or undermine ethnic attachments to distant lands
and was in line with nationalist discourses in war times.
Different European groups, however, arrived at “assimilation” via
different routes. For instance, unlike the earlier waves of Northern
and Western European migrants, those from Eastern and Southern
Europe experienced discrimination and even racialization that stigmatized them as inferior to the Anglo-Saxon stock in America.7 The
newest European immigrants still strove to distinguish themselves
from the African-Americans, who occupied the lowest rungs in the
racial hierarchy in America.8 Their exclusion from the “core culture”
was accompanied by their assertion of difference and superiority to
African-Americans during the Jim Crow era. Despite their early experiences of racial and religious bigotry, these stigmatized groups eventually became part of the dominant “white” groups in America, as
they integrated through socioeconomic mobility and intermarriage
as well as residential integration. Other groups remained excluded
from the assimilation debate. Illustrating their Eurocentricism in who
was deemed capable of assimilation, early proponents of this position
wrote:
In America it has become proverbial that a Pole, Lithuanian, or Norwegian cannot be distinguished, in the second generation, from an American born of native parents…As a matter of fact, the ease and rapidity
with which aliens, under existing conditions in the United States, have
been able to assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of American life have enabled this country to swallow and digest every sort of
normal human difference, except the purely external ones, like color of the
skin.9

Similarly, even scholars writing in late 20th century presented the
inevitable “truth” of the racial dynamics in America already acknowledged by Park and Burgess.10 In this vein, Alba and Nee wrote in 1997
that:
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The most intractable racial boundary remains that separating those
deemed phenotypically black from whites. This boundary is likely to exert a
powerful influence on the adaptation possibilities of immigrant groups,
depending on where they are situated with respect to it… . 11

Understandably, then, the assimilation paradigm of the first part of
the 20th century came under fire with the civil rights movement and
the 1965 immigration law reforms, which transformed the source and
the characteristics of immigrants. Prior to this time, American immigration laws curtailed non-European migration with discriminatory
quotas that were only favorable to Europe.12 Hence, 1965 immigration policy reforms represented progressive attempts in line with the
civil rights debates of the day and eliminated the legal discrimination embedded in earlier quota systems. These developments not only
transformed policies dealing with American race relations, but also
ushered in a new direction for assimilation debates.
Scholars focusing on post-1965 migration, which was dominated
by non-Europeans, highlight how race and ethnicity factor in to the
Americanization experience. The former disregard or even attempt to
explain the experiences of African-Americans, as well as the diversity
of the Asian and South American dominated migrations, undermined
the old straight-line conceptualization of assimilation. The emerging discourse on migrant settlements analyzed the structural barriers intrinsic in American racial stratification and its consequences for
migrants of color. Scholars such as Glazer, Moynihan, and Portes highlighted how racial stratification and structural conditions in America
can block assimilation outright. This racial and ethnic disadvantage
perspective brings to the fore how factors other than agency and social
capital can play a pivotal role in whether groups integrate economically, residentially, and politically. This is not to say that race or ethnicity is solely a burden, but rather that these can be both resources as
well as burdens in migrants’ pursuit of mobility.13 A more recent extension of this debate combines the straight-line assimilation arguments
with the ethnic/racial disadvantage paradigm. Portes’ and Min Zhou’s
formulation of “segmented assimilation” underscores that while
assimilation defined as upward mobility and integration of newcomers holds true for some skilled migrants enjoying high levels of human
capital, the opposite is true for the majority of labor migrants of color,
who also assimilate, but join those on the margins of American racial
and socioeconomic stratification.14 Attention to the structural barriers
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that Americans on the margins—as well as millions of labor migrants
with extremely limited human capital—confront in America is key to
understanding the type of assimilation that occurs and how race and
class factor into this process. This formulation pays attention to “the
contextual, structural and cultural factors” that lead to divergent paths
of assimilation.15
III. Portrait: Somali Migration to America
Somalis are part of an increasing African migration trend that commenced in the 1970s. Though migrants and refugees categorized as
“Black” in the American racial scheme remain numerically small when
compared to Asians and Latin Americans, this group nevertheless represents a significant segment of the American ethnic mosaic. According to the Population Reference Bureau, immigration accounted for “at
least one-fifth of the growth in the U.S. black population between 2001
and 2006.”16 Those from the African continent accounted for one-third
of the foreign-born blacks in America in 2005.17 The African presence
in the United States is intrinsically tied to the founding of this nation,
when millions of enslaved Africans were transported for plantation
work. Following the abolition of slavery in the early 19th century, there
was virtually little or no migration from the African continent to the
Americas. Black migration to the United States in the first part of the
20th century only consisted of small numbers originating in the Caribbean. This changed with the liberalization of immigration laws, which
also coincided with technological advancements in travel as well as the
independence of many African nations and subsequent economic and
political turmoil in post-colonial Africa.
It is within this historical context that the political catastrophe in
Somalia triggered one of the largest refugee resettlement programs
in the United States. In fact, Somalis are the largest African refugee
population in the U.S. today, accounting for 5.5 percent of all refugees
admitted between 1983 and 2000, but 25.4 percent of those admitted
between 2001 and 2005.18 For the latter time frame, only Cuba has sent
more refugees to the U.S. (31.4%). The state of Minnesota has become
home to two of the largest refugee populations in recent history: the
Hmong in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Somalis since the early 1990s.
The Somali refugee presence in Minnesota owes much to the strong
voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) in this Midwestern state. These organizations sponsor and assist refugee resettlement programs. A combina-
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tion of the very strong Minnesota economy in the early 1990s (with
unemployment dipping to around 2 percent in the late 1990s, the lowest rate in the whole country19) and the presence of the robust refugee
assistance network largely explain the Somali concentration in Minnesota. Chain migration naturally follows once you have a large enough
number of any group establishing itself in a given metropolitan setting, with newcomers benefiting from the settlement experiences of
earlier migrants, with their accumulated knowledge of local practices
and institutions.
Somali migration to America is hence a recent phenomenon and
only took off following the collapse of the Somali state in the late 1980s.
Close to 100,000 Somalis have been granted refugee status since 1990.
This number excludes those born in the United States, which is probably a significant population given this community’s high birth rate.20 A
small number of Somali students came to the U.S. in the 1960s through
the 1980s. Some of these students returned once they completed their
education, whereas some had no choice but to stay on in America, with
a change in immigrant status from student to asylee or refugee. Thus,
the analysis of Somali migration to America over the last two decades
covers an extremely narrow span of time, and mostly involves data
collected from the first generation and their children. The analysis and
conclusions presented on Somali settlement thus represent reflections
on the trajectory of this emerging community in its relations with other
groups in America as well as its adjustment to its new home.
IV. Refugee Status, Family Obligations, and Relative Poverty
Two key factors integral to understanding Somali settlement experiences in America are the limited human capital that they came with
and their financial obligations to kin left behind. First, human capital
refers to Somali refugees’ overall educational levels and language and
other knowledge and skills. While Somalis who came to the U.S. prior
to the collapse had higher educational levels, the majority of newcomers had very low levels of formal schooling. The opportunities available to the majority of Somali youth to acquire formal education in a
predominantly nomadic society were severely limited. Except for a
small number who were educated through an English curriculum in
the Northern parts of Somalia and another group that were educated
either in Italian or Arabic in the South, formal educational institutions
were non-existent in colonial Somalia. Positive legacies of the dictato-
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rial regime of Siad Barre were the Somali script in the early 1970s and
the expansion of educational opportunities to a larger segment of the
population in towns and cities. Educational opportunities involved
primary and secondary education in Somali, with limited post-secondary educational prospects. Consequently, even Somali refugees who
had some post-secondary education in the home country came to the
Western world with very limited English language skills and with educational credentials that were difficult to transfer to American labor
markets. This limited human capital has great ramifications for their
settlement in America.
The second factor that is instrumental in our understanding of the
Somali settlement experience involves the collapse of the Somali state
in the late 1980s and the resulting displacement and impoverishment
of millions whose physical and material security was utterly compromised. More than a million Somalis fled to Kenya and Ethiopia and
in fact hundreds of thousands of them remain in a protracted refugee
condition. Those who made it out of these difficult circumstances and
who arrived in the developed world have left their immediate and
extended family members in these precarious situations. Strong family ties inherited from Somali culture and the Islamic faith promote
a commitment to support and provide for dozens or even hundreds
of kin left behind. Such obligation is significant for Somali migration
and settlement strategies and has real consequences for their socioeconomic tactics and attitudes toward their new society.
V. Federal and State Refugee Assistance Laws
Understanding the refuge experiences of survival in a context of dispersion and settlement in different parts of the globe is crucial in order
to appreciate refugee agency while remaining cognizant of entrenched
structural barriers migrants and refugees confront in America. The
social and economic challenges Somali refugees are experiencing in
the United States remain steep. In contrast to labor migrants, refugees automatically qualify for numerous types of federal, state, and
local support to assist them in their settlement and integration process.
Though refugee assistance in the form of cash that VOLAGs provide
is limited to less than year, the majority of refugee families qualify for
cash assistance, food stamps, and subsidized housing, as well as medical care, through their federal and state human and health services
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departments. This provision remains vital for poor refugees’ economic
and survival strategizing.
My ethnographic work within this community leads me to conclude
that social services remain a crucial part of the economic survival of
Somali refugees in America as well as other developed nations. A large
segment of this refugee community, including intact families who have
at least one parent working, depends on these services. State assistance
is crucial for these families since one parent’s salary is unlikely to meet
the subsistence needs, the market price housing rental, and the skyrocketing private healthcare insurance required for a family. This holds
true for most Somali men and women who either work in low-paying
jobs in which healthcare is not provided, or work as taxi or truck drivers, or run small family stores that only cater to their co-ethnics.
There is rich scholarship that details the marginal economic opportunities available to low-skilled refugees in American metropolitan
areas in the current post-Industrial economy.21 Access to state and federal support, which are reduced over a longer stay in the country,
continues to be essential for refugee families whose decisions and economic strategizing require them to maximize public benefits as well as
employment income. Like many other poor Americans, Somalis often
combine work and public assistance, and thus benefit from many state
and federal services as well as local charity organizations while pursuing educational and employment opportunities. Minnesota Family
Investment Program (MFIP) data from the Minnesota Department of
Human Services shows that an important segment of the Somali population relies on public assistance for their everyday survival. MFIP
helps low-income families with children to meet their basic economic
needs, through cash grants for a limited term of sixty months as well
as with food stamps. This program also assists individuals in accessing
skills and language training. Utilizing these services does not mean that
these individuals are not in the labor force. On the contrary, Somalis on
MFIP have higher average reported earned income than whites and
African-Americans on this program, with an average monthly earning
of $1,065, second only to Asian-American income.22 Urgent demands
to support families left behind in conflict zones, whose needs take precedence over attempts to pursue educational and skills development,
can hinder these commendable efforts. Stretching an income that is
already low relative to the mainstream standard in order to meet the
basic needs of multiple families unfortunately has major consequences
for the refugee household in America.23 This cycle of work, public
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assistance, and financial remittances to families elsewhere diminishes
the ability of individuals and families to save and to execute long-term
financial planning for them and their children. Many resort to survival techniques that involve planning from month to month, placing
them in a precarious socioeconomic position. Consequently, Somalis
accounted for over six percent of all MFIP eligible adults in Minnesota
from 2003 to 2009. This group is thus overrepresented on public assistance rolls and has lower levels of success in welfare-to-work efforts
than all other groups, including Hmong refugees and African-Americans.24
The overall level of human capital in this refugee population in part
explains the high dependency on government support. For example,
Somalis have one of the lowest rates of high school completion of MFIP
participants.25 Overrepresentation in government assistance ranks
and its consequences also emerge from the recent American Community Survey, which highlights Somali refugees’ marginal socioeconomic position within the larger American society. This report found
that Somalis experience extreme poverty rates when compared to all
groups, including other African migrants, other black migrants from
the Caribbean, and African-Americans. The 2007 American Community Survey found Somalis to have the highest poverty rate of all newcomers to America, closely followed by those born in Iraq and the
Dominican Republic. At a 51 percent poverty rate, this level of poverty
was in fact four times the national rate in the U.S. for that year, and
double that of African-Americans.26 This high poverty rate is in stark
contrast with the average median income of Muslims in America, a
group hailed as “Middle Class and mostly mainstream” by a recent
Pew Research Center Report. Muslim Americans on average compare
well to the U.S. public in terms of education and income, with 41 percent of Muslim families having an average median income of $50, 000
or more annually (compared to 44% of the general population).27 Consequently, Somalis arguably stand in an extreme position when compared to other Muslims in America, as well as to the African-American
population, which on average fares worst in all social-economic indicators. Going back to our earlier theoretical discussions of how new
groups might be integrated into their new societies, high poverty rates
translate to Somali integration into the lowest strata in the racial and
economic stratification in America.
This statistical data relating to welfare dependency, as well as the
findings from the American Community Survey, are consistent with
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my findings from ethnographic work with the Somali community.
What emerges from this research is the difficulty of securing sources
of income that are sufficient to permit them to get off public assistance.
This is especially the case for women with children, who in the Minnesota case account for 84 percent of Somali families on MFIP.28 Most
of these individuals have very limited language and training skills,
and thus have an extremely difficult time joining the labor force for
any length of time. While pressured by MFIP to train and seek employment, hundreds of Somali women that I have interviewed report that
they fail to let go of this safety net. Their only employment options
are often in sectors like janitorial services that require them to work at
night when they have childcare commitments. A small number of these
women end up seeking strategies to extend their sixty-month eligibility on the grounds of health and disability. Again, while the trauma
of civil war and the violence that followed probably explains some of
these requests, such applications are often made out of desperation for
the need for public assistance, which is critical to both their survival
and the survival of their kin back in Africa.
In addition to income insecurity, access to decent housing remains
an integral part of immigrants’ integration. Consistent with the persisting racial and economic segregation in America,29 refugee newcomers
become part of the American socioeconomic stratification that separates inner-city dwellers from those in suburbia. Inner-city America
continues to be dominated by racially marginalized groups that are
mostly composed of African-Americans and Hispanics.30 Moreover,
inner-city areas are often plagued by crime, violence, and poorly performing schools. Refugees and many labor migrants of color who cannot afford high rental prices come into direct contact and competition
with those in the lowest socioeconomic strata in the American community. These groups’ inclusion into inner-city America supports the
segmented assimilation approach that Portes and Zhou postulated,
and results in the racialization of newcomers of color into the Black
American category.
Somalis distinguish themselves from African-American inner-city
residents. Their low level of human capital and their financial obligations to kin left behind, however, promote their active pursuit of affordable public housing. This produces the strong intra-ethnic resource of
a highly developed Somali network to share information about public
housing across the nation. Some families even travel to faraway places
that do not have large refugee populations, such as North Dakota or
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Nashville, to secure public housing or Section 8 certificates, with the
plan to eventually return to their original state. Clearly this testifies to
the desperation for affordable housing that many refugees experience.
Market costs of $1,000–$1,500 for apartments and houses remain out
of reach for many who are reliant on government subsidies often combined with low-paid, unskilled work. That this income is shared with
dozens of immediate and extended family members elsewhere and is
thus stretched beyond its limits further makes public housing demand
within this community understandable. The stigma mainstream Americans attach to inner-city housing was non-existent for Somali refugees
when they got here. This is changing, however. Recent media coverage of Somalis living in very dangerous public housing complexes
in Omaha, Nebraska, illustrates the discrepancy between the security
concerns of these refugees, who fled from civil war, and the crime and
drug problems that plague some of these inner-city areas. Somali families in this public housing became so terrorized by the constant threats
and crime in their neighborhood that they stopped coming out of their
houses, and even stopped sending their children to school.31
In states with significant numbers of Somalis, one can find whole
public or subsidized housing complexes that are now predominantly
Somali residential areas. Examples of these include the Cedar-Riverside area in Minneapolis, the Lexington complexes or Afton View
apartments in St. Paul, and the Capital Park apartments in Columbus,
Ohio. Some of these housing complexes were formerly African-American areas, but these have been replaced by a flow of Somalis who
share information about the units and their availability, and thus create a “chain” replacement and concentration, or segregated, area. One
positive consequence is the creation of a community niche within these
alien urban centers where Somalis find psychological security within
their own group. Moreover, these areas provide business opportunities
for a small number of these refugees, with halal groceries and clothing stores, such as those in Karmel and Mall 24 in Minneapolis. But
the overall depression that plagues these areas with low-performing
schools and high crime rates persists and negatively impacts newcomers. Somalis are now becoming more apprehensive about the consequences of this type of housing for them and their children, but most
continue to view affordable housing, no matter where this might be
located and no matter its stigma, as a requirement in order to survive
while fulfilling their multiple commitments to family members in different parts of the world.
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Public assistance and public housing are indisputably necessary
for the initial survival of newcomers. Yet potential ramifications for
the prospect of success of the “1.5 generation,” or those who arrive
as children to the U.S., as well as the second generation and beyond,
require attention. Research on black Caribbeans in the U.S. shows that
most first-generation Caribbean parents brought with them strong
cultural and human capital. This group resisted American racialization schemes with concerted efforts to distinguish themselves from
the African-American population—through overt usages of accent,
through claims of having a better work ethic, and through assertiveness that differs from that of African-American employees. Many of
their children nevertheless became integrated into the African-American inner-city cultural attitudes toward mainstream society as well as
institutions. This represents “segmented assimilation,” or the integration of different groups into various sectors of society, with the expectation that those immigrants whose socioeconomic and human capital
most resembles those of African-Americans will fare worse than others.32 Mary Waters, who has done extensive work on this topic as it
relates to West Indian migrants, cogently argues that these parents’
strong cultural and human capital cannot compete with the institutionalized American racial discrimination.33 She shows how “residential
segregation and de facto educational segregation” influence the life
chances and future prospects of many in the second generation.34 The
second-generation Caribbeans identify with their African-American
peers with a perspective informed by a sense of exclusion, “outsiderness,” and of not benefiting from the American dream. The experiences
of “Black” immigrants are important for our Somali case study and
especially for the prospects of the younger population in this group.
Data from the Census Bureau shows that Somalis constituted the
group with the youngest population of all foreign-born groups, with
a median age of 26.8 (compared to an average median age of 36.7 for
all U.S. residents).35 How the 1.5 generation as well as the very young
first generation fare in the educational and employment spheres will
influence the trajectory of Somalis either as part of the lowest strata in
American society or as part of an integrated Muslim-American community, maintaining its cultural and religious identity while integrating into mainstream America.
Finally, integration in America entails enjoying the rights granted to
all citizens, which intrinsically brings to the fore the role of the nationstate in allocating rights and responsibilities to its members. These
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rights include civil rights (rule of law, free speech, etc.), political rights
(participating in the political process, elections, voting, etc.), and social
rights (provision of welfare, health care, unemployment insurance,
disability insurance, etc.). The degree of provision of any given right,
however, differs from country to country in most developed Western
democracies. For example, the social rights provided to Canadians or
to the British, such as universal health care, continue to be contested in
the United States. Also, accessing federal public services is highly stigmatized in the American context, in which social citizenship debates
lag those of Europe.36 Fraser and Gordon point out that in the United
States:
Receipt of welfare is usually grounds for disrespect—a threat to, rather
than a realization of, citizenship. In the area of social services, the word
‘public’ is often pejorative. Public hospitals are institutions of last resort,
sites of stigma, not solidarity. The connotations of citizenship are often
positive, powerful, and proud, while those of welfare are so negative,
weak, and degraded that social citizenship here sounds like an oxymoron.37

Fraser and Gordon’s discussion of this stigma highlights a key challenge Somalis confront to full citizenship in the American context. Of
course, other poor and marginalized groups also experience this challenge, which involves how individuals in any given society actively
engage in shaping their nation-state. As Isin and Siemiatycki put it,
“citizenship is not a static experience: citizens actively struggle to
change both the meaning and boundaries of citizenship itself.”38 Thus,
citizenship becomes a practice, a lived experience, in which members
of a given society shape and are also shaped by full engagement with
the social, economic, and political institutions that prevail in a given
historical moment.39 Somali migration at its core was due to a failure of
the freedom to practice citizenship, with dictatorial rule that limited all
rights and then with myopic warlords that toppled one dictator to subject people to multiple forms of terror. One can argue that the notion of
citizenship in both its legal and sociological varieties is a new concept
for Somalis living in the American context. Access to public services,
protection from violence, and the ability to vote (once naturalized) are
all common rights that Somalis are accessing. But Somali experiences
of pervasive poverty and segregation, as well as their classification
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as a pariah public burden—or what Fraser and Gordon call “charity
cases”—can curtail their full exercise of citizenship.40
VI. Conclusion
This essay has two conceptual and two policy implications that I
would like to emphasize. It is important to reiterate the very short time
span that has passed since Somalis settled in the United States in large
numbers. Their struggles are in many ways consistent with what earlier groups with similar socioeconomic and educational backgrounds
endured. Hence, one should not read this analysis as a suggestion
that their current condition is their destiny. Theoretically, the Somali
case reinforces the trends observed in earlier analyses, such as Portes’
and Zhou’s, which point out the barriers to integration that unskilled,
post-1965 migrants of color confront in the American arena.41 This
case study shows how Somalis’ low level of human capital contributes to their marginalization in the United States. However, there is a
dual process at play in this case: while segmented assimilation stresses
the process of new groups with low human capital joining those on
the margins of society, this Somali case study shows how they voluntarily segregate and distinguish themselves from African-Americans.
This group is also involuntarily being segregated from mainstream
white America by socioeconomic imperatives pushing them into public housing. Thus, the nature of the Somali location in the American
stratification system testifies to this refugee groups’ agency in rejecting American racialization schemes, while structural conditions place
them in marginal inner-city ghettoes. Given the recent nature of Somali
migration, it is difficult to know how the 1.5 generation and the second generation will fare, but trends observed in the schooling and
resources available in the areas in which Somalis are concentrating
indicate a continuation of this segregation and further marginalization
within the wider American society.
A second conceptual implication relates to the exercise of citizenship. While segregation might provide a certain level of security for
a group thanks to ethnic cooperation and shared resources, its longterm impact is detrimental for all of society. It undermines shared
interests across racial and class divisions. Moreover, limited contact
across groups entrenches prejudices and separation, with some groups
becoming further excluded from belonging to the imagined community.42 The irony is that while Somalis’ co-ethnic interdependency in
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America, as well as with their kin elsewhere, represents the ultimate
citizenship ideal of common destiny and mutual obligation and solidarity, their exclusion and limited resources in America place them on the
margins of mainstream America’s understanding of social rights. That
view is intrinsically based on the “contractual” agreement whereby
only those who contribute to the pot may draw benefits from the social
contract.43 Somalis contribute to different pots: one in Somalia, where
millions of people are surviving thanks to remittances from low-wage
and low-prestige employment in America, often combined with American social service benefits. They also contribute to an American pot in
the form of cheap labor. These contributions, however, are viewed as
incommensurate with what they draw out, which can generate resentment from mainstream Americans who stigmatize them as burdensome and parasitic.
This essay also provides two important policy ideas. A community that is relatively new and relies heavily on public provisions is
bound to face a backlash on the policy front. Similar to some European
nations, the current economic recession the United States is pushing
for severe austerity measures that include restrictions on public assistance. Despite this environment, understanding the multiple competing obligations that migrants and refugees negotiate everyday can help
policymakers better address the challenges migrants confront in their
integration process. For migrants to reap the myriad opportunities
America provides, there needs to be a more concerted effort to incorporate them into the American fold, through better-funded programs
to build migrant and refugees’ meager human capital. Such investment
enriches the American mosaic and the American economy, with newcomers fostering a rich, diverse, and productive American labor force.
Second, an investment in programs that promote a better understanding of what it means to be an American, with knowledge of the
beauty as well as the ugly scars in the history of this great nation, can
also accelerate the newcomers’ process of integration. Such understanding would permit newcomers to appreciate the long struggles of minorities, such as African-Americans, as well as the contentious dynamics
of nation building in which Americans of all races participated. Such
an investment would support new immigrants in better understanding their citizenship rights as well as obligations. The absence of such
policy-level efforts will lead to limited immigrant engagement with the
greater society and with American institutions. This can only further
entrench their marginalization and undermine their participation in
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the political process. Remaining on the margins of society entails devastating long-term repercussions for future Somali-Americans, and we
all have an obligation to prevent such a calamity.
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